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Blood II: The Chosen

In 2028, a hundred years after the events in Blood, the world has changed. The Cabal has been transformed from a cult to a megacorporation. It has succeeded in seizing control of the world through economic and political power, rather than overt bloodshed. The person responsible for this is Gideon, the leader of the Cabal. He has taken the cult into the 21st century, but still yearns to destroy Caleb, now known as the Great Betrayer. Only by doing this can he assume full control of the Cabal and become the next incarnation of Tchernobog.

Blood II: The Chosen

Next I found out it would crash when using too high of resolution so added DxWnd to limit the resolution to 1280x960. Finally blood2.exe would crash when clicking the "Display..." button so I had to use the winmm.dll stub to load dxwrapper.dll.

The gameplay in Blood II is relatively simple and fairly standard for first-person shooters of the time: hectic and extremely bloody combat encounters with some extremely light puzzle elements. The gameplay generally has a fairly frantic pace to it, in large part due to the player's rapid move speed, excessive firing rate and sheer lack of reloading.

In regions renowned for cruelty, Caleb was legendary. Born in western Texas in 1847, he had already acquired the reputation of a ruthless gunslinger by the age of 17. His bloodthirstiness took on a menacing new timbre not long afterwards, when he entered the Cult of Tchernobog, but the real massacre started when he was betrayed and discarded by his master, the Dark God Tchernobog himself...

Blood II starts off one hundred years after the orginal game, with the chosen on known as Caleb who realizes that he must resurrect the other three Chosen and use their combined power to wrest control from the Dark God he once defeated.

Perfusion and oxygenation of experimental tumours were studied during angiotensin II (AT II) administration whereby the rate of the continuous AT II infusion was chosen to increase the mean arterial blood pressure (MABP) by 50-70 mmHg. In subcutaneous DS-sarcomas the red blood cell (RBC) flux was assessed using the laser Doppler technique and the mean tumour oxygen partial pressure (pO2) was measured polarographically using O2-sensitive catheter and needle electrodes. Changes in RBC flux with increasing MABP depended mainly on tumour size. In small tumours, RBC flux decreased with rising MABP whereas in larger tumours RBC flux increased parallel to the MABP. As a result of these volume-dependent effects on tumour blood flow, the impact of AT II on tumour pO2 was also mainly tumour volume-related. In small tumours oxygenation decreased with increasing MABP during AT II infusion, whereas in large tumours a positive relationship between blood pressure and O2 status was found. This disparate behaviour might be the result of the co-existence of two functionally distinct populations of tumour vessels. In small tumours, perfusion decreases presumably due to vasoconstriction of pre-existing host vessels feeding the tumour. In larger malignancies, newly formed tumour vessels predominate and seem not to have this vasoresponsive capability (lack of smooth muscle cells and/or AT receptors), resulting in an improvement of perfusion which is not tumour-related per se, but is due to the increased perfusion pressure.

In vitro studies indicate that bilirubin and other albumin-bound substances can be efficiently removed from plasma by filtration over albumin-conjugated agarose beads. The effectiveness of this technique in vivo was investigated in rats by using a closed extracorporeal hemoperfusion system. Five Gunn rats whose endogenous bilirubin pool had been labeled with [3H]bilirubin and five Sprague Dawley rats with surgically created biliary obstruction were chosen as models of unconjugated and conjugated hyperbilirubinemia. Indocyanine green was injected into rats and its removal also studied. In the Gunn rats, 98% of the bilirubin was removed from plasma during the initial pass over the column as determined isotopically and chemically. Plasma bilirubin levels fell more than 70% from 8.21.6 mg/100 ml (meanSD) to 2.60.5 mg/100 ml during a 1-h hemoperfusion. An average of 1,061 μg of bilirubin was recovered from the columns, representing 22.54.2% of the total exchangeable bilirubin pool and 9636.4% of the plasma pool. Results were similar in the rats with biliary obstruction and in those given indocyanine green. Normal Sprague Dawley rats experience minimal changes in formed blood elements, electrolytes, and proteins as the result of hemoperfusion. When the total volume of the column did not exceed 51% of the estimated blood volume of the animal, the survival rate was 100% in 20 studies, and the procedure was without observable ill effect. Extrapolation of both in vitro and in vivo data to man suggests that extracorporeal hemoperfusion over albumin-agarose columns may be a practical means of assisting hepatic excretory function.

The issue decided in this case is that a police officer has not exceeded his authority under the implied consent law by determining with respect to a driver arrested for driving under the influence of alcohol that it was feasible to administer only one of the three chemical tests--the blood test--because of the driver's injuries and apparent need for medical attention.

The Department of Motor Vehicles (hereinafter DMV) appeals from a judgment granting the petition of Tim Smith for issuance of a peremptory writ of mandate directing the DMV to set aside its order suspending Smith's driving privilege for six months based on his refusal to submit to a blood test following his arrest for driving while under the influence of alcohol. (Veh. Code, 13353.) fn. 1 We reverse.

While driving his automobile, Smith was involved in a nighttime accident. An officer of the California Highway Patrol who responded to the accident call found the injured Smith within his vehicle pinned against a telephone pole such that the assistance of the fire department was required to pry the vehicle open to remove him. The officer detected a strong odor of alcohol [179 Cal. App. 3d 372] on Smith's breath and noted that his eyes were bloodshot and watery and his speech was incoherent. Observing that Smith had suffered lacerations, contusions and considerable loss of blood, the officer summoned an ambulance to the scene of the accident. The officer did not administer a field sobriety test due to Smith's possible injuries.

The officer next advised Smith that he was required to submit to one of three chemical tests: blood, breathalizer, or a urinalysis to determine the alcohol content of his blood. Medical personnel would not allow Smith to get off the gurney to provide a urine sample for the officer. Based on that admonition and Smith's apparent condition, the officer determined that it was inappropriate and unsafe to allow Smith to get off the gurney for a urinalysis to be completed. In the officer's opinion, the only available chemical test which was feasible for Smith to take was the blood test.

The patrolman then explained to Smith that, because he was required by law to submit to a chemical test under circumstances where the extent of his injuries had not yet been determined, the only test that was feasible to administer at that point was the blood test; if he refused or failed to complete the blood test, his driving privilege would be suspended. Smith declined to complete the blood test. After giving Smith a reminder of the consequences of his refusal, the officer left the hospital.

The DMV contends that the trial court erred in granting a writ of mandate and argues that the highway patrolman correctly chose not to offer Smith a [179 Cal. App. 3d 373] choice between taking a blood test and a urine test because the officer properly determined it was not feasible for Smith to take anything other than a blood test under the facts of this case.

[4] As one of the measures designed to attack the problem of drunk driving, the Legislature enacted the implied consent law which provides that "a person who drives a motor vehicle upon a highway and who has been lawfully arrested upon reasonable cause to believe that he was driving while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and has been admonished as to the provisions of ... section 13353 shall be required, upon penalty of suspension of his driving privilege, to select, submit to, and complete one of three specified chemical tests to determine the alcoholic content of his blood." (Butler v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1981) 115 Cal. App. 3d 913, 915 [171 Cal. Rptr. 525].) fn. 3 "The implied consent law is intended 'to [179 Cal. App. 3d 374] obtain the best evidence of blood alcohol content at the time of the arrest' (Kesler v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1969) 1 Cal. 3d 74, 77 [81 Cal. Rptr. 348, 459 P.2d 900]) by means of securing 'the civil cooperation of all persons privileged to drive' (McDonnell v. Department of Motor Vehicles (1975) 45 Cal. App. 3d 653, 662 [119 Cal.Rptr. 804]) ...." (Id, at p. 916.)

[5] Under section 13353, all drivers must be given a choice of a blood test, a breath test, or a urinalysis. However, the Legislature restricted the arrestee's choice when an arrestee is incapable or states he is incapable of performing any chosen test ( 13353, subd. (a)(2)(A)) or if it is necessary to transport the arrestee to a medical facility for treatment and it is not feasible to administer a particular test. ( 13353, subd. (a)(3).) In either case, the arrestee's choice is limited to those tests which are both feasible and available. ( 13353, subds. (a)(2)(A), (a)(3).) In common parlance the words "not feasible" mean simply "unreasonable" or "unsuitable." (Webster's New Collegiate Dict. (1973) p. 415.)

In Butler, the arresting officer gave the arrestee the choice of all three chemical tests--breath, blood and urinalysis. The arrestee chose the blood test, but refused to sign the hospital's internal waiver form. As a result, the hospital would not administer the test. The court held that the officer acted within his discretion when he concluded that the arrestee was incapable of performing the blood test within the meaning of section 13353. In Buchanan, the arresting officer again gave the arrestee the choice of all three chemical tests. The officer stated that they would soon be passing by the hospital and that, if the arrestee opted for the blood test, he was required to indicate his choice prior to passing the hospital. The arrestee waited until they arrived at the police station to indicate he wanted the blood test. The Court of Appeal held the arresting officer's conclusion that the arrestee was [179 Cal. App. 3d 375] incapable of performing a blood test to be proper under such circumstances. Finally, in McConville, after the arresting officer gave the arrestee all three choices of chemical test, the arrestee chose urinalysis. He completed the first part of the test by voiding his bladder, but when it came time to provide the second sample 20 minutes later, he was unwilling to comply. Again, the court found the officer's determination that the arrestee was incapable of performing the chosen test to be proper. 041b061a72


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